




















Security verification for continuous variable quantum key distribution
Yi-Bo Zhao, Zheng-Fu Han,∗ and Guang-Can Guo
Key Lab of Quantum Information, University of Science and Technology of China, (CAS), Hefei, Anhui 230026, China
Noise estimate is crucial to the continuous variable quantum key distribution. In the estimate
many parameters should be evaluated, including the mean, variance, attenuation and the normality.
Then how the inaccuracies of so many parameters affect the security becomes a problem. Here we
will discuss a test method and illustrate the relationship between its inaccuracy and the amount
of secret keys. Through analyzing Eve’s possible attack way of obtaining additional information,
we show which parameter is determinant under specific conditions. Finally, we will see that the
minimum sample size for the channel test should be exponentially proportional to the transmission
distance.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is of great impor-
tance to the cryptograph. Up to now there are two main
kinds of schemes, single photon [1] and continuous vari-
able (CV) [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] one. Compared with the
single photon one, the CVQKD does not require the sin-
gle photon detector and source and thus is expected to
provide high secret key rate. At present, there are sev-
eral schemes that have been suggested for the CVQKD,
including the direct reconciliation (DR) [14], reverse rec-
onciliation (RR) [2, 4, 5, 6], DR&post-selection (PS)
[3, 7] and RR&PS [8, 9] one. Among these schemes,
the DR one cannot break the 3dB loss condition. To
break the 3dB limit, the RR or PS should be employed.
The DR&PS has a good performance on resisting the ex-
cess noise, but its secret key rate decreases sharply with
the increase of the channel loss. The RR scheme is pre-
sented by Grosshans et al and supposed to be potential
to provide high secret key rate over arbitrary distance.
However, In Ref. [15], Zhao et al showed that a secret
key cannot be distilled for the Gaussian modulated pure
RR scheme at too long transmission distance just for the
imperfection of practical error corrections. To make the
RR scheme feasible the PS should be introduced. In Ref.
[8, 9, 10], Heid and Zhao et al respectively showed a
way to combine the RR scheme with the PS. Zhao et al
demonstrated that if the PS and other tactics are utilized
for the CVQKD, secret keys can be distilled with high ef-
ficiency over 100 km fiber by practical error corrections
[10]. Heid and Lu¨tkenhaus proved that the PS also can
make the RR scheme resist more excess noise [9]. More-
over, many of recent experiments showed the feasibility
of the CVQKD [6, 11, 12, 13]. In Ref. [13], Lance et al
established the secret keys rate 1k/s for 90% channel loss,
which is really high compared with the single photon one
[21]. Therefore, it is expected that the CVQKD plays an
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important role for the cryptography in the future.
For the RR, DR&PS and RR&PS schemes, the condi-
tional noise estimate is crucial. In Refs. [2, 10], it has
been showed that if the conditional noise and entropy es-
timate is employed, various channel noises introduced by
Eve can be restrained, so that the security of arbitrarily
modulated scheme and the reconciliation can be guaran-
teed. Also in Refs. [8, 9], it is assumed that the noise be-
tween Alice and Bob is Gaussian. Then the accurate es-
timate of the conditional noise distribution is important
for the CVQKD. It is known that an unknown parame-
ter cannot be estimated by the statistical method with-
out any error, nevertheless, the security of the CVQKD
is much sensitive with parameter inaccuracies [2, 6], and
a small estimate error may cause the security analysis
totally wrong. Moreover, the number of the parameters
of a totally unknown distribution is infinite in principle,
whereas the estimable statistics is finite. Then how to
test the channel effectively and how much errors can be
tolerated should be given.
Here, we introduce the hypothesis testing to check
the channel, which is going to be discussed mainly for
schemes suggested in Refs. [2, 10], but also effective for
other kinds of CVQKD. We assume the channel secure
at first and then test whether this assumption is true, so
that a judgment criterion can be given. For the statis-
tical fluctuation, the estimated parameter of an insecure
system may show it secure topsy-turvy. In the follow-
ing it can be seen that through the hypothesis test this
problem can be solved, but certain amount of secret keys
should be given up to compensate this fluctuation. Con-
sequently, we show that to obtain a high confidence and
low secret key loss at the same time, the minimum sample
size should be exponentially proportional to the length
of the transmission line. To illustrate the influence of the
estimate inaccuracy to the security, in the following, we
will discuss Eve’s possible attack in detail. Finally it can
be seen that this test can restrain Eve’s attack effectively
and the conditional variance estimate is enough to limit
Eve’s eavesdropping while the bit assignment efficiency
is always 100%, whereas the normality test is crucial if
this efficiency is low.
2II. CHANNEL TEST
In the CVQKD protocol presented in Ref. [2] Alice
sends a random coherent state |a〉 to Bob. Then Bob
measures its x or p quadrature through the homodyne
detection. If all the apparatus are ideal then Bob’s mea-
surement result will obey a Gaussian distribution of mean√
Gαx (
√
Gαp) and variance N0, where G denotes the
channel transmission efficiency and N0 denotes the vari-
ance of vacuum noise [2, 4]. However, in practice the ap-
paratus noise and Eve’s attack are inevitable, so the dis-
tribution of Bob’s measurement results may deviate from
the above Gaussian noise distribution. It has been shown





Gαp) as well as variance N0+δN0,
the security of CVQKD can be guaranteed, where δN0
should be smaller than γGN0 and γ is a parameter de-
termined by Alice’s modulation [2] and the reconciliation
[10]. Generally speaking, the small noise introduced by
apparatus is always Gaussian. Then if without Eve’s at-
tack, this condition can be satisfied. While under Eve’s
attack, if this distribution is changed to the non-Gaussian
or the δN0 is increased larger than γGN0, Alice and Bob
will cancel this communication. Then Eve cannot steal
any useful information in the effective communications.
Now a problem posted to Alice and Bob is how to esti-
mate the conditional distribution.
Suppose after many quantum communications, Al-
ice and Bob publish their continuous variables Ax =
{ax,1, ax,2, . . . , ax,n}, Ap = {ap,1, ap,2, . . . , ap,n}, Bx =
{bx,1, bx,2, . . . , bx,n} and Bp = {bp,1, bp,2, . . . , bp,n} to es-
timate the channel, where the index x and p denote the
variable measured from x and p quadratures. Since the
x and p quadratures are always symmetric, in the fol-
lowing, we will no longer distinguish them and simply
employ a and b to describe Alice and Bob’s variables re-
spectively. If there is no eavesdropping, the distribution
of their data will be of the Gaussian noise case, satisfying







where the σ2 denotes the variance of the noise between
Alice and Bob and G is the channel transmission [3].
In the practical system the σ2 is always unknown and
needs to be estimated. Theoretically, the variance satis-
fies σ2 ≥ N0. One necessary condition of the security is
σ2 ≤ N0 + γGN0 [2]. During the communication, there
may be Eve’s attack and channel noise, so that the noise
may no longer be Gaussian and the σ2 may be larger
than N0 + γGN0. Then Alice and Bob should utilize
those data to detect the eavesdropping. If finding that
the noise is not the additive Gaussian of variance less
than N0 + γGN0 as well as mean zero, they will judge
this system insecure and give up all the data. While test-
ing the channel, Alice and Bob should guarantee that if
the channel is insecure they find it at least with proba-
bility 1 − β, where β is an exponentially small positive
number, and if the channel is secure they should judge
it secure with a high probability. Define the hypotheses
H0: the channel is secure, and H1: the channel is inse-
cure. Also define the type I error as the case that Alice
and Bob reject the hypotheses H0 while the channel is
secure, and the type II error as that they accept the hy-
potheses H0 while the channel is insecure. Then in the
QKD we require that the probability of happening type
II error is exponentially small and that of happening type
I error is not too large.
In practice, we should estimate σ2 with high confi-
dence coefficient within the interval [N0, N0 + γGN0),
where G may be of order O(0.1), and consequently the
required sample size is very large. Therefore the test
method should be with high performance and low com-
putational complexity while n→∞.
There are many normality test methods now, includ-
ing the chi-square goodness of fit test, called χ2 test in
the following, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, W, D, kurtosis and
skewness test [16, 17, 18, 19], where W and D test are dif-
ficult to deal with the large sample, Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test requires the tested distribution is known. The kur-
tosis and skewness tests have a better performance than
the χ2 test under certain condition but are insufficient to
test the normality. Therefore we employ the χ2, kurtosis
and skewness tests to do the normality test in the follow-
ing. The channel noise test can be implemented by the
following steps.
1. Test the hypotheses, H10 : µ = 0, H
1
1 : µ 6= 0, where
µ describes the mean value.
2. If the H10 is accepted, test the hypotheses, H
2
0 :
σ2 < N0 + γGN0, H
2
1 : σ
2 ≥ N0 + γGN0.
3. If theH20 is accepted, test the hypotheses,H
3
0 : βs =
0, H31 : βs 6= 0, where βs denotes the skewness.
4. If the H30 is accepted, test the hypotheses, H
4
0 :
βk = 3, H
4
1 : βk 6= 3, where βk denotes the kur-
tosis.
5. If H40 is accepted, test the hypotheses, H
5
0 : the
noise is Gaussian, H51 : the noise is non-Gaussian.
If H50 is accepted, then Alice and Bob can be sure
about that the channel is secure. Here we require that
the type I error and the type II error probabilities are
smaller than α and β respectively. In the above tests, the
H1 hypotheses of 1, 3, 4, 5 steps are irrational, since we
can always accept them. To solve this problem, we will
introduce the estimate error in the following. If the errors
belong to certain range, we reject the H1 hypotheses.
Later we will discuss influences of this inaccuracy to the
security.
We estimate the mean value µ through (
√
Ga− b). For
convenience, set X = (
√
Ga − b), which will be called
noise in the following. The test Φ1 defined as that if
3∣∣X¯
∣∣ ≤ C1, accept H10 , else reject it. The σ can be esti-
mated through S, where S2 = 1n−1
n∑
i=1
(Xi − X¯)2. Then
√
n(X¯ − µ)/S obeys the student distribution of freedom
n-1, which will be simply called t distribution in the fol-
lowing. The density function of the t distribution of free-
dom n is given by tn(y) = Γ[(n+1)/2]/[
√
npiΓ(n/2)](1+
y2/n)−(n+1)/2, where Γ is the Gamma function given by
Γ(n/2) = 1·3·5 · · · (n−2)·2−(n−1)/2√pi. In the following,
we use tn−1,α to denote the α quantile of the t distribu-
tion, defined by
∫ tn−1,α
−∞ tn−1(y)dy = 1−α. Then the test
Φ1 becomes that while
∣∣√nX¯/S
∣∣ < tn−1,α/2, accept H10 .










n) with confidence coefficient β.
Under some condition, the line transmission ratio G
may be also unknown and require the estimate. The
G can be estimated through the maximum likelihood



























In the step 2 we can use S2 = 1n−1
n∑
i=1
(Xi − X¯)2 to
estimate σ2. It is known that the (n−1)S2/σ2 obeys the
chi-square distribution of freedom n−1 (denoted by χ2n−1





n−1(y)dy = 1 − α. Then





0 . To reduce the type II
error probability below β Alice and Bob should accepte
H21 while (n − 1)S2 > (N0 + γGN0)χ2n−1,1−β . Here we
see that α and β cannot be both small at the same time.
Actually, a reasonable hypotheses H20 should be σ
2 <
σ20 , where the σ
2
0 denote the variance of practical system
noise. Then the test Φ2 becomes accepting H
2
0 while
(n − 1)S2 < σ20χ2n−1,α. While (1 + γG)N0 > σ20 ≥ N0,
we have
(1 + δ)χ2n−1,α < (1 + γG)χ
2
n−1,1−β, (2)
where δ = (σ20 −N0)/N0. It can be seen that to obtain a
low α and β at the same time, we should set the sample
size large enough.






(Xi−X¯)2]3/2 . The test Φ3 of step 3 can be defined as
that if |τs| < C3, accept H30 . Under the condition that
the distribution is normal, the first and second moments
of the distribution of τs respectively are [20]: E(τs) = 0,
D(τs) =
6(n−2)
(n+1)(n+3) . Then according to the Chebyshev
inequality, we have P (|τs| > α) ≤ D(τs)/α2. Then in the
skewness test C3 ≤ D(τs)/α2.






(Xi−X¯)2]2 . The test Φ4 of step 4 can be defined as
accepting H40 if |τk − 3| < C4. While the distribution is
normal, the first and second moments of the distribution
of τk respectively are [20]: E(τk) =
3(n−1)
n+1 , D(τk) =
24(n−2)(n−3)
(n+1)2(n+3)(n+5) . Therefore, in the kurtosis test C4 ≤
D(τk)/α
2.
Here we employ the χ2 test to check the normality. Set
K = 20. At first we divide the interval (−∞,∞) into K
parts, I1 = (k0, k1], I2 = (k1, k2], . . . , IK = (kK−1, kK),
where ki = (Ni/K−X¯)σ and Ni/K is the 1−i/K quantile
of the standard normal distribution. It can be seen that
the whole interval is divided with equiprobability. De-
fine the statistical quantity Z =
∑K
i=1K(ni − n/K)2/n,
where ni describe the number of samples that belong to
the interval Ii. Since there are three unknown parame-
ters, It can be seen that Z obeys the χ2 distribution of
freedom K − 4 [17]. Then the test of H50 becomes Φ5:
accept H50 while Z < χ
2
K−4,α. Because in the χ
2 test
we divide the whole interval into several small intervals
and actually only check the distribution of the small in-
tervals, we cannot test the distribution within each small
interval. In practice, we can suppose that the fine distri-
bution within the small intervals cannot be controlled by
Eve and thus is needless to be checked.
We can see that Z =
∑K
i=1 n(fi − Pi)2/Pi, where Pi
describes the assumed probability of the interval Ii and
fi describes the practical frequency that the samples be-
long to Ii. While reducing the probability of type I error,
we should also exponentially lower the probability of type
II error. If under the condition that the theoretical distri-
bution is unknown, Alice and Bob can use fi to estimate
Pi. However, the distribution of Z obeys the χ
2 distribu-
tion at n→∞ only when the H50 is valid. Here we can do
an approximation, still regarding the distribution of Z as
χ2 while Pi slightly deviate from the assumed value. If we
estimate the Pi by fi, the confidence interval of Pi with
confidence coefficient 1−β is fi± δPi. Then we approxi-




i /Pi obeying the χ
2 distribu-









δPi = 0. While the H
5
0 is valid, the practical fi
may also deviate from the normality distribution with




i /Pi < χ
2
K−4,α and∑
δfi = 0. Then we can see that if the real distribu-
tion deviates from the normal with |δPi + δfi|, we may
also accept the H50 hypothesis.
III. TEST DISCUSSION
In the above we discussed how to do the normality test.
Here we will analyze its inaccuracy. Because of the insta-
bility and Eve’s attack, the above tested parameters are
4not always constants [21]. Then Alice and Bob should
test them not only for the eavesdropping detection but
also for many other processes, such as reconciliation [10]
and system adjustment. Therefore, we should not only
discuss the misjudgment probability but also show the
influence of the estimate inaccuracy to the following pro-
cesses. Moreover, it is possible that Alice and Bob cannot
distinguish whether the noise is caused by the environ-
ment or Eve’s disturbance. In the security analysis, a
rational assumption is that all the noise is introduced by
Eve’s attack. Since the environment noise is inevitable,
Alice and Bob do not abort the communication while de-
tecting the eavesdropping or the excess noise but cancel
it while parameters exceed certain threshold. Thus, al-
though in the above test we assume that the mean of
the noise is zero and the distribution of it is normal,
we do not give up these communications while their real
value slightly departure from the assumed one. In prac-
tice, even if we accept the above hypotheses, we may still
evaluate the parameters by the estimated results rather
than the assumed value. Here, we employ the hypothesis
test to check the channel, because the estimated value
does not always represent the real one and the statisti-
cal errors are ineluctable. Then even though a system is
insecure at all, the estimated value may show it secure.
Thus we should have some preconception about the sys-
tem, assuming it secure or insecure beforehand and only
when the result show the hypothesis obviously wrong,
will we reject it.
While we do the sampling check, the exposed variable
should be discarded. Then the test results are only use-
ful for the remained un-sampled variables, so they should
represent the parameters of the remained variables accu-
rately.
It is possible that the mean of the noise is non-zero, for
example, while the zero point of apparatus has not been
corrected. The inaccuracy of the estimate of the mean
will affect Alice and Bob’s following coding. For example,
while µ = 0, coding bi larger than zero to binary digit
1 and bi smaller than zero to 0 is a symmetric assign-
ment to Alice and Bob. If µ 6= 0 and they do not know
it, the coding will no longer be symmetric. In principle,
only the mean deviating from zero does not allow Eve to
obtain more of Bob’s information, but in practice it will
lower Alice and Bob’s reconciliation efficiency and thus
affect the security [10]. The inaccuracy of the mean esti-
mate is equivalent to adding a noise to Alice and Bob’s
coding. The maximum variance of this noise is smaller
than (X¯ − µ)2. While the H10 is accepted, (X¯ − µ)2 ≤
S2(tn−1,α/2+Stn−1,β/2)
2/n. The information loss caused







with probability at least 1 − β, where we have done an
approximation to the Shannon information [23]. This
loss should not exceed the amount of secret keys. Then
we have
S2(tn−1,α/2 + tn−1,β/2)
2 ≤ nγGN0 (4)
Actually, for a system that has been strictly zero ad-
justed, we may believe the mean is zero, while the esti-
mated value is slightly deviate from it.
The variance of the noise can affect the mutual infor-
mation between them and the amount of Eve’s attacked
additional information [2]. To guarantee the security, we
require the probability of type II error smaller than β.
While the hypotheses H21 is rejected, we should not re-
gard S2 as the real variance, but determine it by the
confidence interval. If the estimated variance is S2 then
the real variance is smaller than (n−1)S2/χ2n−1,1−β with
probability larger than 1 − β. Then we should regard
(n − 1)S2/χ2n−1,1−β as the real variance for the confi-
dence, although the variance of the noise introduced by
Eve is S2 with high probability. The variance of the
equivalent noise introduced by the inaccuracy of the es-
timate is [(n−1)/χ2n−1,1−β−1]S2. It can be seen that to
ensure the system secure with high probability, certain
amount of secret keys should be sacrificed.
The accuracy of the normality test will influence en-
tropies. The conditional entropy between Alice and Bob
can be defined asH(B|A) = −∑Ki=1 Pi log2 Pi−∆, where
∆ is a constant determined by K [23]. If H50 is valid,
we have Pi = 1/K and H(B|A) = log2K − ∆. While
the Pi is perturbed, Pi → Pi + δP ′i , the entropy will be











i /Pi. The maximum pertur-
bation can be given by |δPi + δfi|. Then we have
δH(B|A) ≤ 2(χ2K−4,α + χ2K−4,β)/n. (5)
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Eve’s attack, in general
It has been shown in Refs. [2, 10] that to obtain Bob’s
information, Eve has two direct information sources, Al-
ice and Bob. Then she can utilize the information re-
ceived from these two sources to estimate Bob’s variables.
The maximum information Eve can obtain from Alice is
restricted by the Holevo bound [2]. While using this in-
formation to estimate Bob’s keys, Eve should estimate
the channel between Alice and Bob well at first. Then
she can estimate Bob’s key through a Markovian channel
Eve → Alice → Bob. If there is no excess noise, the
noise on Bob’s side is the minimum vacuum noise and
there is no opportunity left to Eve to control the noise
[2]. However, the excess noise is inevitable in practice.
Under the condition of excess noise, Eve can control the
fine noise distribution to obtain a better estimate, but
she should guarantee the total average noise distribution
can pass the channel test. Then her ability of control-
ling Alice and Bob’s channel is limited. Eve may control
5Bob’s channel through various methods, one example of
which is the entangling cloner [6] presented by Grosshans
et al. Here we do not care about Eve’s concrete attack
while just discuss all possible fine noise distributions that
may allow Eve to learn additional information. If Eve
does not control Alice and Bob’s channel noise, she can
learn certain amount of information from Bob through
the Markov chain. While utilizing the channel noise, her
obtained information will be more than that obtained
purely through the Markov chain. The additional infor-
mation obtained through utilizing the channel noise can
be regarded as obtained through the non-Markovian way,
and will be called non-Markovian information in the fol-
lowing.
Here, we will discuss the possible eavesdropping under
the tests Φ1 to Φ5. The samples of these tests are ran-
domly sampled from a large number of variables. Only
when distributions of remained un-sampled variables are
independent and identical with that of the samples, the
estimated distribution is that of the remained variables.
Actually, the independence and identicalness are not al-
ways true. Eve can attack each variable through differ-
ent method, and then the identicalness can be broken.
There may be such case that some variables are totally
attacked but not sampled by the estimation. Then it will
leave Eve more opportunity to obtain the secret keys. In
the CVQKD, we allow Eve to obtain certain amounts of
information, whereas if she cannot steal all the informa-
tion, we can always establish the pure secret keys through
the privacy amplification [24]. Then Alice and Bob can
just test whether Eve has attacked the whole information.
Here we can suppose that Eve’s attack is effective only
when she employ it to steal a considerable deal of keys
that occupy certain proportion in the whole variables.
Since each communication will be sampled by the same
probability and Eve cannot know which variable will be
sampled, for her each key is identical. Then any of Eve’s
effective attack method cannot escape from the sampling.
Suppose Eve’s attackE will cause the noise between Alice
and Bob to be PE(X |a, e), where e denotes Eve’s possible
state. This attack will be sampled with the probability
Pr(sampling|a,E) = Pr(sampling). Suppose Eve em-
ploys the tactic E with probability P (E|a) in attacking
m samples (m → ∞), where it has been assumed that
Eve’s decision depends on Alice’s variables. Then Alice





















x[ρPr(x)]. Of course that P0(X)
passes the tests Φ1 to Φ5 dose not mean that each
PE(X |a, e) can pass.
In the reverser reconciliation CVQKD, to attack Bob’s
information Eve has two channels to employ, a Marko-
vian and a non-Markovian channel [2]. The channel noise
allows Eve to obtain non-Markovian information. Here
we will call all the attack that utilizes the channel noise
non-Markov attack. Eve’s attack should guarantee that
noise between Alice and Bob can pass the tests Φ1 to Φ5.
Then the non-Markovian information obtained through
non-Markov attacks is given by I(E : B|A,Φ1, . . . ,Φ5).
Here, we will discuss this information in detail and give
Eve’s possible attacks under the channel test.
B. Eve’s attack, neglecting the reconciliation
In Eq. (6), we can see that even though the vari-
ance of P0(X) can pass the test Φ2, the variance of some
PE(X |a, e) may be far from hypothesized variance. Sup-
pose Eve’s attack Eσ2 will cause the noise between Alice
and Bob to be P (X |a,Eσ2) =
∐
e
PEσ2 (X |a, e) of vari-
ance σ2, where we have already supposed that Eve’s
attack is symmetric to quadratures x and p. It has
been shown that H(Bx|E,Ax) + H(Bp|E,Ap) ≥ 2H0
[2, 4, 25]. Then the maximum information that can be
obtained through the non-Markovian channel becomes
maxH(B|A) − minH(B|E,A) = 2[maxH(B|A) − H0].
Set H ′σ2 = 0.5 log2
σ2
N0
, which is the maximum entropy
while the variance is σ2. It can be seen that the maxi-
mum non-Markovian information under the attack Eσ2
is 2H ′σ2 .
If Eve randomly chooses method Eσ2i with proba-





i ≤ σ20 . Here, we can see
that besides obtaining the information through each at-
tack Eσ2i Eve can also learn the information from the
variation of σ2i , which means that random changing
the Eσ2i can also establish certain amount of informa-
tion between her and Bob. This information cannot
be known by Alice, since she does not know which
Eσ2i is chosen by Eve. The amount of the informa-
tion carried by the variation of σ2i can be evaluated
by the following way. If without this information,




Pσ2i P (X |a,Eσ2)],
where Θ(ρ) denotes the Shannon entropy of the prob-
ability density function ρ [23]. If this information





Pσ2iΘ[P (X |a,Eσ2)]. There-










If Eve randomly changes the Eσ2i and maintain each
P (X |a,Eσ2) to be Gaussian, the P0(X) may become
non-Gaussian, whose entropy is smaller than that of the
Gaussian one if under the same variance condition. Fi-

































and the equal is satisfied only
when σ2i = σ
2




Eve can steal Bob’s information through obtaining a
better estimate of Alice and Bob’s channel. For the
Markovian channel Eve → Alice → Bob, if the mutual
information between Alice and Bob is increased, that be-
tween Eve and Bob may be also increased. Then Eve
can control Alice and Bob’s channel and randomly op-
timize it. If this optimization regularity is not known
by Alice and Bob, they cannot obtain more information
through this optimization but Eve can. To optimize Al-
ice and Bob’s channel, Eve should control the channel
noise. Suppose Eve’s attack Eρ can make the noise be-
tween Alice and Bob to be ρ(X |a, e). While Eve employs
a set of E = {Eρi ,Pr(Eρi)} to attack, where Pr(Eρi ) de-
notes the probability of the method Eρi , the total noise




Alice and Bob can only know the
∐
a,e
ρ0 through the chan-
nel test but cannot know the exact ρi, which is known
by Eve. If the channel noise were ρi, the mutual infor-
mation between Alice and Bob will be larger than that
under the ρ0 noise condition, which means that if knew
the exact variables of Alice, Eve could estimate Bob’s
variables more precisely than Alice. Then after learning
Alice’s information, she can estimate Bob’s quadratures
through the optimized Markov chain better than she es-
timate it with ignorance of ρi and thus obtain some addi-
tional information. The amount of this additional infor-
mation is determined by the variation of ρi. As previous








Pr(Eρi)Θ(ρi). If Eve brings a noise ρi to
one of Bob’s quadrature, she certainly brings a conjugate
noise ρ¯i on the other quadrature. With the large enough
sample size, both ρi and ρ¯i will be sampled by Alice and
Bob with equiprobability. For the uncertainty theorem,
we have Θ(ρi)+Θ(ρ¯i) ≥ 2H0 [2, 4, 25]. The noises on two
conjugate quadratures are not always symmetric. Alice
and Bob is to estimate the noises on both quadratures
separately, so although ρi and ρ¯i are sampled with the
same probability in total, Eve can control their sampled
proportion in one quadrature estimation. Suppose, while
Alice and Bob estimate the x quadrature, the ρi and ρ¯i
are respectively occupy the proportion of Pr(Eρi )Px and
Pr(Eρi)(1−Px). Then while they estimate the p quadra-
ture, they will occupy the proportion of Pr(Eρi)(1 −





Pr(Eρi)[PxΘ(ρi) + (1− Px)Θ(ρ¯i)].
Eve should guarantee that noises on both quadra-
tures can pass the channel test. Then the minimum∑







ρ0) ≤ H0 + H ′σ2
0
, the maximum infor-




In the above discussions we can see that no matter
how Eve attacks Bob’s information, the maximum non-
Markovian information she can obtain from the non-
Markov channel is 2H ′
σ2
0
. Also no matter what Alice’s
modulation is, only when the noise between Alice and
Bob is Gaussian, can the amount of Eve’s non-Markovian
information approach the maximum. Alice and Bob can
limit Eve’s obtained information just through the vari-
ance test, and the normality test is unnecessary.
C. Eve’s attack, utilizing the reconciliation
To establish the final binary secret keys mapping those
continuous variables into common binary bit is required
[10, 22], so while considering the security of CVQKD, we
should also take the reconciliation into account [10]. The
reconciliation is always constituted by quantization, the
coding and the error correction. Here we only consider
the quantization and the coding (QC). After the QC,
the mutual information between Alice and Bob becomes
ξI(A : B), where ξ is the efficiency of QC. The efficiency
of the QC will depend on the type of the channel noise.
Under this condition, while the noise is changed, not only
I(A : B) and I(E : B) will be changed, but also ξ will
be alternated. Then Eve can control both I(A : B) and
the ξ to attack more information. The influence of the
noise to the QC efficiency can be illustrated by the figure
1, where the solid and doted line respectively describe
distributions of the variables under two kinds of noises.
The coding method is to code the x < 0 to 0 and x ≥ 0
to 1. We can see that if under the condition of the noise
denoted by the solid line, the QC efficiency is lower than
100%, while if under the condition of the noise denoted
by the doted line, the efficiency is 100%, since before and
after the QC the mutual information remained to be 1
bit.
Because the ξ is not a constant, I(E : B) < I(A : B)
no longer means the CVQKD secure after the QC. For
the QC presented in Ref. [10], it has been shown that if
we introduce the noise estimate into the reconciliation,
Eve’s attack is largely limited to the Markovian attack
and the non-Markovian attack is still determined by the
excess noise.
If Eve takes no account of the QC, her information at-




-bit, large portion of which may be lost during
the QC. To steal as much information as possible Eve
should adjust the noise to reduce the loss of the non-
Markovian information, while the average introduced
noise should pass the channel test. Suppose ξρ is the QC
efficiency and Iρ(A : B) is the mutual information be-
7FIG. 1: Illustration of the influence of the noise to the quan-
tization and coding efficiency, where the solid and doted line
respectively denotes the case of two kinds of noise. It can be
seen that the noise denoted by the doted line has no influence
to the quantization.
tween Alice and Bob while the channel noise is ρ(X |a, e).
If there is Eve’s attack, Alice and Bob cannot know the
exact ρ(X |a, e) in each communication. They can only
know the average noise estimated by the channel test.
However, Eve can utilize ρ(X |a, e) to attain a better es-
timate of Bob’s variables. Then Eve can know an addi-
tional information carried by the variation of ρ(X |a, e).
Suppose Eve attacks Bob’s information through a se-
ries of methods E = {Eρi ,Pr(Eρi )}. Then after the
QC the mutual information between Alice and Bob is






knew the ρiof each communication, the mutual informa-
tion between her and Bob after the QC would become





Pr(Eρi )ξρiIρi(A : B). Even though
Eve cannot obtain as much information as I¯c(A : B), she
can utilize the knowledge of knowing Alice and Bob’s
channel better than Alice to learn certain additional in-
formation of no more than I¯c(A : B) − ξρ0Iρ0 (A : B)-bit
from one variable on average through the Markov chain
Eve → Alice → Bob, where we have already supposed
that H50 and H
2
0 hypotheses are valid and all possible
noises are just a perturbation to the ρ0. Actually, even
if only the noise type changed and I(A : B) remains
the same, the mutual information between Eve and Bob
may be changed. Here, under the perturbation condi-
tion, this effect cannot help Eve to obtain the information
more than I¯c(A : B) − ξρ0Iρ0(A : B)-bit. Although this
additional information is obtained through the Markov
correlation, the channel optimization is realized by the
non-Markov way. Therefore, this additional information
still belongs to the part of non-Markovian information,
I(E : B|A,Φ1, . . . ,Φ5). Actually the maximum non-
Markovian information can be understood through an-
other aspect. If Eve were ignorant the information car-
ried by the variation of ρi, her estimate of Alice and Bob’s
channel would only be based on ρ0. She can estimate this
channel better just because she obtains certain additional
information carried by the variation of ρi. Then the
upper bound of the amount of non-Markovian informa-









where δIρ describes the information transmitted by the
variation of ρi. As previous discussion, we see that




D. Mutual information estimate
While estimate Eve’s maximum information attacked
from Bob, Alice and Bob should estimate the mutual
information between themselves precisely at first. For
the Markov chain, Eve → Alice → Bob, if the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob is increased, the
mutual information between Eve and Bob may be in-
creased too. Then if Alice and Bob underestimate the
mutual information between themselves, they may also
underestimate that between Eve and Bob. Therefore,
the accurate estimate of the mutual information is cru-
cial to the security. Here, we only test the conditional
noise and do not test the mutual information. Actu-
ally, from I(A : B) = H(B) − H(B|A) we can see that
if Alice’s modulation is given, the mutual information
can be tested through the conditional entropy estimate.
It can be proven that if H50 and H
2
0 hypotheses are ac-
cepted, the underestimated mutual information between
Alice and Bob satisfies δI(A : B) ≤ −δH(B|A). The
maximum δH(B|A) can be given by the Eq. (5), and
thus the maximum δI(A : B) can be obtained. Also,
while the H50 and H
2
0 are accepted, the maximum un-
der estimated mutual information between Eve and Bob
satisfies δI(E : B) ≤ δI(A : B). Thus
δI(E : B) ≤ −δH(B|A) (7)
In the security analysis we always regard I(A : B) −
I(E : B) as the secret key rate. If Eve’s information can
not be obtained from the Markov channel, the underesti-
mate of Alice and Bob’s information do not affect the se-
curity. However, the underestimate is fatal here. During
the reconciliation, some reconciliation information should
be exchanged, the amount of which is determined by the
estimated information. For example, if Alice and Bob
want to construct m-bit common binary keys from one
variable, then m − I(A : B)-bit information should be
published. If the I(A : B) is underestimated, then the
I(E : B) will be underestimated and more public infor-
mation should be transmitted. Then the final amount of
secret keys should be subtracted by δI(E : B). There-
fore, for the RRCVQKD the practical secret key rate
should be given by
∆Iprac = Iest(A : B)− Iest(E : B)− δI(E : B), (8)
where Iest describes the estimated information.
Eqs. (5) and (7) show the possible underestimate
caused by the channel test. δI(E : B) < ∆IQC will
give a minimum accuracy for the normality test, where
∆IQC denotes the theoretical secret key rate after the
8QC. Actually, if we ignore the QC, the normality test




. While we take the practical QC into account, the
normality test becomes crucial. We can see that to guar-
antee δI(E : B) < ∆IQC after the QC we should make
ξρ0 |δIρ0 (A : B)| + δξρ0Iρ0 (A : B) < ∆IQC , a sufficient
condition of which is
|δH(B|A)|+ δξρ0Iρ0(A : B) < ∆IQC . (9)
The ξρ0 relies on the noise type and the QC. Then the
normality test should guarantee Eq. (9) to be satisfied.
Here we employ the χ2, kurtosis and skewness tests to do
the channel check, mainly because different QC sensitive
with different errors. For example, in the QC of Ref.
[10], they utilized the noise distribution while |X | ≫ 0 to
reduce the computational complexity, and consequently
that efficiency is sensitive with the distribution at |X | ≫
0. Then the distribution estimate errors should be very
small at |X | ≫ 0. The χ2 test only shows the summation
of errors in all the intervals and thus is not proper for
the estimate. The kurtosis and skewness tests are to
check the high order moment and therefore have a good
performance while we check the distribution at X →∞.
Then kurtosis and skewness tests are effective for the QC
presented in Ref. [10]. The accuracy requirement of the
kurtosis and skewness test can be given by Eq. (9) and
the concrete QC.
E. Summation
In the CVQKD, to ensure the probability of Eve’s suc-
cessful attack arbitrarily small, certain amount of secret
keys should be discarded away to counteract the inac-
curacy of the parameter estimate. Since the CVQKD
is much sensitive with those parameters, the mount of
discarded secret key may be exaggerated compared with
the amount of secret keys. Therefore, while we consider
the security, the statistical fluctuation of the estimate
should be taken into account. The inaccuracies of the
mean, variance and normality respectively require cer-
tain amount of secret keys to be compensated. An effec-
tive test should make all of Eqs. (4), (2) and (9) to be
satisfied at first. Actually, it also should guarantee the
total amount of compensated secret keys smaller than
the theoretical amount of secret keys. The total amount






+(n− 1)/χ2n−1,1−β − 1]
+2(χ2K−4,α + χ
2
K−4,β)/n+ δξρ0Iρ0(A : B) (10)
Then the total amount of excess noise should be





+2 ln 2[2(χ2K−4,α + χ
2
K−4,β)/n
+δξρ0Iρ0 (A : B)] < γG (11)
Here it can be seen that only when S2 < γGN0, there
exist a n that satisfies Eq. (11). Since G is always expo-
nentially proportional to the minus of the length of the
transmission line, the n should be exponentially propor-
tional to the transmission distance.
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
For the statistical fluctuation, parameters of an inse-
cure system may show it secure topsy-turvy. Here, we
solved it through the hypothesis test. During the test,
we also estimated all the required unknown parameters.
After discussing Eve’s possible attacks, we showed the
influence of the estimate inaccuracy to the security. It
is showed that the error of the mean estimate introduces
a equivalent noise to Alice and Bob’s coding, the inac-
curacy of the variance estimate cause certain amount of
secret key to be discarded for the compensation and the
inaccuracy of the normality test induce Alice and Bob
underestimate their mutual information.
In conventional scenario, the underestimate of the
mutual information between Alice and Bob may make
the result more reliable, but here we show that in the
RRCVQKD this underestimate can consequently induce
the underestimate of the mutual information between
Eve and Bob and thus may cause the insecurity on the
contrary.
The statistical fluctuation is inevitable. To compen-
sate it and obtain a reliable result, certain amount of
secret keys should be sacrificed. We showed that to en-
sure the amount of sacrificed secret keys smaller than
that of the distillable secret keys, an effective channel
test should guarantee Eqs. (2), (4), (9) and (11) to be
satisfied. Consequently we demonstrated that the min-
imum sample size will be exponentially proportional to
the transmission length.
Finally, it can be seen that through this security veri-
fication, the security of the RRCVQKD and its reconcili-
ation can be tested. While the reconciliation is neglected
or its efficiency is always 100%, the normality test is use-
less, whereas if the efficiency of the reconciliation is sen-
sitive with the noise distribution, the normality test is
crucial.
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